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SEXUAL DIGNITY IN RAPE LAW 
 




Dignity is a famously contested concept, suggesting its deployment as a legal principle 
should be closely scrutinized. This Article sets out a functional and contextual analysis 
of dignity as an organizing principle underpinning rape law, which I term “sexual 
dignity”. Based on sexual violence theory, I trace the “democratization” of sexual 
dignity over time, as dignity and attendant rights of autonomy and equality have 
gradually extended from man to the (qualified) woman to women as a group, and 
identify an emerging contemporary feminist consensus on the meaning of sexual 
dignity. This framework is then applied to a critical review of how judges across 
common law jurisdictions understand and use dignity in decisions on rape. The 
caselaw of sexual dignity illustrates that dignity is a usefully capacious concept for 
exploring and condemning the multiplicity of rape’s harms and wrongs. However, 
uncritical engagement with sexual dignity can be harmful, with implications both for 
rape law and for the regulation of sexual behaviour generally. As such, I argue that 
robust and reflective engagement with sexual dignity is both necessary and productive. 
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Sexual assault … is something more than a simple act of violence. … 
It is an assault upon human dignity.1 
 
[R]ape is a violation of personal dignity …2  
 
Sexual violence … is a serious blow to her supreme honour and 
offends her self-esteem and dignity.3 
 
There are many words that can be used to describe the harms and wrongfulness of rape. 
One word which is frequently deployed by courts around the world in relation to crimes of 
sexual violence is dignity. In some ways, this is not surprising. Since the end of the Second 
World War, human dignity has emerged as the foundational principle of international 
human rights law and of many domestic constitutional orders. As a result, the use of dignity 
as a juridical device is increasingly common. Dignity is also a prevalent concept in debates 
on sexuality, sexism and sex. On the other hand, contemporary rape laws generally focus 
on consent and autonomy, rather than dignity, when distinguishing rape from sex. Yet time 
and again, as illustrated above and explored below, judges return to dignity in decisions on 
sexual violence.  
                                                   
 
1 Supreme Court of Canada, R v Osolin [1993] 4 SCR 595, 669. 
2 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Judgment, Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Chamber I, 2 September 1998 
[597]. 
3 Supreme Court of India, State of Karnataka v Krishnappa (2000) (4) SCC 75, 15. 
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The prevalence of dignity talk in this context suggests that dignity may be doing 
important expressive or doctrinal work in relation to the criminalization of sexual 
behaviour. However, dignity is a famously contested concept, vulnerable to accusations 
that it can mean or do whatever one wants it to mean or do. Such concerns about 
indeterminacy suggest that dignity in sexual violence caselaw should be closely 
scrutinized. 
This Article explores and critically interrogates the deployment of dignity in judicial 
decisions on sexual violence. My aim is to map the broad contours of dignity’s use as an 
organizing principle in the law of rape, which I term “sexual dignity”. My approach is 
empirical, in that I am seeking to build a bottom-up understanding of how this concept is 
used in caselaw. It is also contextual, in that I am focusing on a specific legal context or 
“language-game”, that of sexual violence, rather than seeking to identify a general, abstract 
concept of dignity as a cross-cutting legal value; the inquiry does not assume that the same 
conception of dignity will necessarily apply in other legal contexts.4 When it comes to rape, 
how is dignity understood and used in caselaw and what are the possible theoretical and 
doctrinal implications of a sexual dignity approach?  
I begin in Part I with an introduction to the unsettled status of dignity as a general legal 
principle, including concerns about vagueness, as well as a review of dignity as an 
organizing principle for claims about sex/sexuality/sexism. The remainder of the Article 
focuses on sexual dignity specifically. Before turning to the caselaw, I set out in Part II a 
review of dignity in sexual violence theory, identifying an emerging feminist consensus on 
the meaning and value of dignity as a way to conceptualize the multidimensionality of 
rape’s harms and wrongdoing. This provides a thematic framework for mapping and 
critiquing, in Part III, the use of dignity in sexual violence caselaw from multiple domestic 
criminal law jurisdictions. What conceptions of dignity are apparent, and do these measure 
up to a contemporary feminist understanding of sexual dignity?  
In Part IV, I discuss the implications of sexual dignity as a framework for rape law. 
My aim is not a top-down theorisation of dignity as the unique ethical wrong of rape; I do 
not argue that dignity is the only or best way to express or define the harms and 
wrongfulness of rape.5 Both as a social and legal structure, I assume that non-consent is a 
defining element of rape, and I do not directly challenge that centrality here. However, my 
analysis suggests that when it comes to non-consensual sexual contact, judges make certain 
assumptions about dignity, which should be unpacked and interrogated. It also shows that 
                                                   
 
4 Mary Neal, Dignity, Law and Language-Games, 25 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 107, 110–11 (2012) (applying 
Wittgenstein’s concept of language-games to legal subdisciplines; as law is comprised of different, albeit interlocking and 
overlapping, language-games, it may be both problematic and undesirable to attempt to set out a general definition of 
dignity as a legal concept). 
5 There is a rich body of jurisprudence that engages with the ethical wrong of rape, including critical interrogation of 
dignity, autonomy, respect and objectification as underpinning concepts: see, e.g., ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING RAPE 
(2001); Joseph J. Fischel & Claire McKinney, Capability without Dignity?, 19 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 404 (2019); John 
Gardner, The Wrongness of Rape, in OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 
(2007); Joshua D. Goldstein & Robin Blake, A (Reconstructed) New Natural Law Account of Sexuate Selfhood and Rape’s 
Harm, HEYTHROP J. 734 (2015); Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity and Criminal 
Law, 11 CAN. J. L. JURISPRUDENCE 47 (1998); Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 249 (1995); 
Carolyn M. Shafer & Marilyn Frye, Rape and Respect, in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY (Mary Vetterling-Braggin et al. 
eds., 1977). 
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dignity is a usefully capacious rhetorical device in this context, commonly deployed to 
express and condemn the multiplicity of rape’s harms, including to the equal dignity 
interests of women qua women. This suggests that a dignity framework might usefully 
inform a broader, less asymmetrical approach to consent.  
But sexual dignity, depending on how it is defined, may have implications for 
autonomy, such as the choice to debase one’s self. Further, given its capaciousness, dignity 
has the potential to be used uncritically, in an “empty-headed moralistic” way, with risks 
for the “normative other”. These pitfalls suggest that it might be preferable to break dignity 
down into its components, more explicitly engaging with dignity’s various dimensions, 
conceptions and underlying arguments. On the other hand, this review of the caselaw of 
sexual dignity suggests that judges will continue to bring dignity, with all its normative 
authority, to the language-game of rape; as such, it is important that dignity is interrogated 
in this context. To that end, this Article ultimately argues that a critical and reflective 
approach to the concept of sexual dignity is needed. 
 
I. THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
A. The Unsettled Status of Dignity in Law 
In the course of my research, I have come across “sexual dignity” used to refer, among 
other things, to the right of elderly persons to be seen as sexual subjects and to experience 
fulfillment and self-worth in sexual interactions;6 something that is diminished in men 
when insulted by a female sexual partner;7 and a communal sense of decency that is 
threatened by pornography and sexual licentiousness.8 In the context of sexual violence 
specifically, sexual dignity has been used as the rallying cry for a mass march of survivors 
in India;9 a catch-all value underpinning criminal laws on sexual assault (“dos crimes 
                                                   
 
6 Hans Wiggo Kristiansen and Linn J. Sandberg, Older Men’s Experiences of Sexuality and their Relevance for 
Sexual Rights, in ADDRESSING THE SEXUAL RIGHTS OF OLDER PEOPLE (Catherine Barrett and Sharron Hinchliffe ds., 
2018). 
7 Ruby Mellen, Man Admits to Fatally Stabbing 24-Year-Old Russian Instagram Influencer, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
2 August 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/08/01/man-admits-brutally-killing-year-old-russian-
instagram-influencer/ (reporting murder suspect as stating that his sexual dignity had been belittled by the victim, leading 
him to murder).  
8 Bedivere Bedrydant, Libertarians Are Coming For Your Sexual Dignity, THE AMERICAN MIND, 20 February 2020, 
https://americanmind.org/features/libertarians-are-coming-for-your-sexual-dignity/; Betsy Hart, Sexual Openness versus 
Sexual Degradation, DAILY REPUBLIC, 28 November 2012, https://www.dailyrepublic.com/all-dr-news/opinion/state-
national-columnists/sexual-openness-versus-sexual-degradation/.  
9 Sian Lewis & Rochin Chandra, Why India’s “Dignity March” Against Sexual Violence Stigma Deserves Attention, 
THE WIRE, 8 March 2019, https://thewire.in/women/india-dignity-march-sexual-violence-stigma (last visited 1 April 
2020).  
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contra a dignidade sexual”);10 and something that is stolen from children who are sexually 
abused11 and that can be reclaimed through therapy.12  
As indicated by this small sampling of references, the idea of sexual dignity is 
contested. . The same arguably applies a fortiori to the concept of “dignity”. Both as a legal 
and philosophical concept, human13 dignity has been critiqued as too capacious to do any 
real theoretical work.14 But as a normative concept, dignity is remarkably prominent. For 
example, dignity has been invoked in key social and political movements of the twentieth 
century, including movements against Nazi ideology in Europe, systemic racism in 
America and global poverty.15 It is incorporated in the constitutional texts of numerous 
states, including Germany, Israel and South Africa, and has emerged as a hallmark of 
international human rights law.16 And courts in jurisdictions such as the United States, the 
constitutional texts of which make no express reference to dignity, nonetheless frequently 
draw on the concept as a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of laws relating to 
a diverse range of personal freedoms.17 It seems the moral authority of dignity is relatively 
settled, despite ongoing debates about dignity’s meaning. 
What is the normative pulling power of dignity? This question requires engagement 
with dignity’s semantic status, which is far from settled. The Western understanding of 
human dignity has its roots in classical, hierarchical Roman ideas of rank, nobility and 
status.18 However as used in modern legal texts and jurisprudence, dignity posits (at a 
minimum) that equal worth inheres in all persons by virtue of their being human and that 
this worth must be recognized and respected by others.19 These two claims, which 
Christopher McCrudden identifies as the ontological and relational claims of dignity 
respectively, comprise the minimum core or essential claim of the concept of human 
dignity; it is the universal appeal of these claims which explains the strong normative status 
                                                   
 
10 Brazil Penal Code [Código Penal] 1940, Chapter Title VI, Crimes Against Sexual Dignity.  
11 Lois Lee, From sexual violation to child prostitution, Kids in the House, 
https://www.kidsinthehouse.com/teenager/parenting-teens/at-risk/from-sexual-violation-to-child-prostitution.  
12 Roman Catholic Diocese of Nelson, Canada, Grief to Grace – Reclaiming the Gift of Sexual Dignity, 
www.nelsondiocese.org/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=1069766&type=d&pREC_ID=1358610 (last visited 1 April 
2020).  
13 I use the terms “human dignity” and “dignity” interchangeably, but as will be apparent, I am focusing exclusively 
on human dignity, and not a concept of dignity as applied to other subjects such as sovereign states. 
14 Mirko Bagaric & James Allan, The Vacuous Concept of Dignity, 5 J. HUM. RTS. 257 (2006). 
15 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 
662–663 (2008). 
16 For an overview of human dignity in international and domestic legal texts, see McCrudden, supra note 15, 664–
75. 
17 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and Sexuality: Claims on Dignity in Transnational Debates Over Abortion and 
Same-Sex Marriage, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 355 (2012). 
18 Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Rank: In Memory of Gregory Vlastos (1907–1991), 48 EUR. J. SOCIOLOGY 201 
(2007). For discussion of non-Western origins and conceptions of dignity, see Part II: Beyond the Scope of the European 
Tradition, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN DIGNITY 145, 147–90 (Marcus Düwell et al. eds., 2014). 
19 McCrudden, supra note 15, 679. This universal, egalitarian understanding of dignity may have theological (persons 
have dignity because they are made in the image of God) or secular (persons have dignity because of their unique 
capacities, such as rationality or autonomy) foundations. For a historical account of the secularization of human dignity as 
a constitutional principle, see Samuel Moyn, The Secret History of Constitutional Dignity (2014) 17 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS 
& DEVELOPMENT LJ 39. 
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of dignity. However, beyond this minimum core, multiple conceptions of human dignity 
are possible.20 
In Western traditions, the human dignity claim is perhaps most commonly tied to a 
Kantian moral outlook: that the intrinsic worth of persons requires treating people not as 
means to an end, but as ends in themselves, thereby respecting their autonomy and 
personhood.21 This framing of dignity places particular emphasis on subjectivity and 
autonomy; dignity is also commonly associated with commitments to other values such as 
life, equality, respect, liberty and privacy. Given its abstract formulation in constitutional 
texts, dignity as a legal principle can be manipulated to frame different, and even opposing, 
claims—for example in relation to abortion, capital punishment, free speech and gay 
rights—depending, in part, on which of its various dimensions is emphasized.22 
This multidimensionality means dignity is vulnerable to accusations of being so broad 
as to be meaningless, “the shibboleth of … perplexed and empty-headed moralists”.23 
Vagueness is not of itself sufficient to dismiss dignity as a potentially useful legal concept. 
Many vague and contested concepts—dignity, justice, fairness, mercy—are used in law.24 
Writing on the concept of property, Jeremy Waldron has argued against assuming that 
“imprecision or indeterminacy” is fatal to the deployment of a legal concept.25 However, 
dignity’s capaciousness suggests that its deployment should be scrutinized closely for 
intellectual laziness. 
Others see this capaciousness as productive. If, as McCrudden argues, the political and 
legal dominance of dignity indicates a universal baseline allegiance to dignity’s essential 
claims, dignity may create discursive space for contests that over time tend to generate 
consensus on human rights and entitlements.26 In relation to dignity in legal texts 
specifically, the argument that dignity is productively abstract raises the issue of dignity’s 
“judicialization”. As Samuel Moyn has argued, it may be that far from representing 
consensus, dignity in fact obfuscates divergence under the pretence of convergence and 
                                                   
 
20 Id., 679–80. See, for further discussion of concepts and conceptions, Maite Ezcurdia, The Concept-Conception 
Distinction, 9 PHIL. ISSUES 187 (1998). 
21 For discussion of the Judeo-Christian foundations of Kant’s theory of human dignity, see JEFFRIE G MURPHY, 
RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED 172–3 (1992). 
22 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 17 (discussing dignity claims in abortion and gay rights adjudication); McCrudden, 
supra note 15; Michèle Finck, The Role of Human Dignity in Gay Rights Adjudication and Legislation: A Comparative 
Perspective, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 26 (2016) (discussing dignity claims in gay rights adjudication).  
23 Arthur Schopenhauer, cited in MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 1 (2012). 
24 Neal, supra note 4, 117.  
25 JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 31 (1988), cited in Neal, supra note 4, 117. 
26 See, e.g., CATHERINE DUPRÉ, THE AGE OF DIGNITY 158–59 (2015) (arguing that dignity’s abstract formulation in 
legal texts “creates conceptual space for interpretations and constructions of human dignity that could not be anticipated at 
the time of drafting”); Siegel, supra note 17, 379 (arguing that “agonists who share an allegiance to dignity … appeal to 
dignity … because dignity’s meaning is unsettled ... and may yet be shaped through appeal to government officials and 
citizens”); Debra B. Bergoffen, The Just War Tradition: Translating the Ethics of Human Dignity into Political Practices, 
23 HYPATIA 72, 90 (2008) (arguing that as a “shared universal [dignity] is both a point of departure and a site of 
contestation”). Cf. Moyn, supra note 19, 66 (raising the possibility that dissensus over dignity may be “so profound that … 
the premise that the same concept is still under debate on different sides becomes a fiction obscuring the reality that 
interlocutors have simply parted ways”). 
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that this very obfuscation abets a troubling transfer of power to judges when it comes to 
decisions about human rights.27 
 
B. Dignity and Sex/Sexuality/Sexism 
Dignity is commonly used to frame normative, including competing or opposed, claims 
relating to sex, sexuality and sexism. For example, Catholic teaching on sexuality is 
predicated on an understanding of the inalienable dignity of the human person as created 
in the imago Dei.28 Dignity is understood as equally bestowed on men and women, who 
share a common humanity but are different and complementary expressions of that 
humanity.29 From this premise, different conclusions can be drawn about acceptable and 
unacceptable sexual behaviour, depending on whether behaviour is framed as fulfilling or 
threatening “human sexual dignity”30—for example, sex between unmarried or same-sex 
persons, pornography, masturbation, sexual violence and non-reproductive sex.31   
The inherent dignity of imago deo is also a foundational belief of Dignity USA, an 
LGBTQI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex) activist movement 
founded in 1969 in reaction to the Catholic Church’s anti-gay teachings. Dignity USA 
argue that LGBTQI Catholics can experience dignity through the integration of their 
spirituality with their sexuality as persons of God made in his image and seek an end to 
the marginalization of sexual minorities by the Catholic Church.32 Dignity USA shares 
allegiance with the Catholic Church to the idea of the dignity of imago deo, across vast 
differences in belief in terms of the moral implications of the dignity value. 
The idea of “human sexual dignity” is prominent in the sexual rights movement more 
broadly. Although the term “sexual rights” is relatively recent, various interest groups 
have fought for human rights related to sexuality for much of the 20th century—for 
example sexual liberation movements, gay and lesbian organisations such as Dignity 
USA and sexual health advocates.33 The sexual rights movement posits that as sexuality 
is a universal aspect of the human person, it is properly viewed as a human rights issue.34 
Claimants of sexual rights seek to harness the rhetorically powerful framework of human 
                                                   
 
27 Moyn, supra note 19, 68–69.  
28 Catechism of the Catholic Church: “Dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the image and likeness 
of God.” See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE THEOLOGY OF THE BODY (1997). 
29 JOHN S. GRABOWSKI, SEX AND VIRTUE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEXUAL ETHICS 110 (2003), citing Walter Kasper, 
The Position of Women as a Problem of Theological Anthropology,  in THE CHURCH AND WOMEN: A COMPENDIUM 58–59 
(Helmut Moll ed., 1988). 
30 Todd A. Salzman and Michael G. Lawler, Vatican II and Sexual Ethics: Past, Present, Future, 32(2) TORONTO J 
OF THEOLOGY 297, 304 (2016). 
31 See e.g. Pope John Paul II, supra note 28; Grabowski, supra note 29, Chapter 5; Glen Argan, Sexual Dignity 
Begins with Respect for All, THE CATHOLIC REGISTER, 3 January 2018; A Grear, In Defense of Human Sexual Dignity: 
Towards a Biblical View of Pornography, CARE BACKGROUND PAPER (1988).  
32 Dignity USA Statement of Position and Purpose, available at https://www.dignityusa.org/news/stub. See, further, 
Natasha Radojcic, Building a Dignified Identity: An Ethnographic Case Study of LGBT Catholics, 63(1) J OF 
HOMOSEXUALITY 1297 (2016). 
33 Ilsa L Lottes, Sexual Rights: Meanings, Controversies and Sexual Health Promotion, 50(3) J OF SEX RESEARCH 
367, 371 (2013). 
34 Alice M Miller, Human Rights and Sexuality: First Steps Toward Articulating a Rights Framework for Claims to 
Sexual Rights and Freedoms, 93 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL ANNUAL MEETING 288, 295 (1999).  
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rights, as premised on a universal understanding of the equal and inalienable dignity of 
all persons regardless of their differences. From this premise, both negative (freedom 
from) and positive (freedom to) rights can be claimed as necessary correlates of dignity—
for example, freedom from sexual abuse, and freedom to flourish as a fulfilled sexual 
being.35 
As discussed by Amy Miller and others, a rights-based approach to sexuality has 
“explosive political ramifications” vis-à-vis the concept of human rights.36 For one, 
claims about sexual rights have “served as a lightning rod for powerfully driven attacks 
on the concept of ‘rights’ as an excessively individualised and atomistic Western 
imposition”.37 A sexual rights framework inevitably raises questions of cultural 
relativism, rights conflicts, individualism, ambiguity, and over-generality, questions that 
can equally be asked of “dignity”.38 For example, Miller acknowledges that a universal 
rights approach may be at odds with the strategic need to highlight specific identities and 
issues.39 Nonetheless, Miller argues that the universal normative force of dignity-based 
rights claims is such that a sexual rights approach could ideally provide a platform for 
marginalised and invisible groups to make claims and demand attention, including 
demands for affirmative conditions that promote the full enjoyment of sexuality.40 
Dignity-based rights claims have also been made by women in the context of sexism 
with respect to employment. At the beginning of the last century, the “living wage” 
movement fought for the labourer’s capacity “to live in a manner consistent with the 
dignity of a human being”.41 However as noted by Alice Kessler-Harris, the movement 
was premised on the life of a “normal man” with a female homemaker, and thereby 
implicitly “excluded the possibility that female dignity could inhere either in a woman’s 
ability to earn wages or in her capacity to support a family”.42 This exclusion of women 
from the dignity of work was critiqued by early feminists, including Wilma Meikle, who 
argued that “feminine dignity” required the independence of the married woman from her 
husband’s income.43  
                                                   
 
35 See, e.g., Helmut Graupner, Sexuality and Human Rights in Europe, 48(3-4) JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 107 
(2005); R R Rios, Towards a Democratic Right to Sexuality (Latin American Center for Sexuality and Human Rights, 
2005). Graupner notes that generally state protection of positive sexual rights “arises predominantly in areas where it 
accords with public attitudes and does not exceed social developments” (125); Miller has likewise noted that “violations 
work” – using a theory of sexual rights to support demands for protection from sexual abuse – has predominated the sexual 
rights movement thus far (Miller, supra note 34, 297). 
36 Alice M Miller, ‘Sexual but Not Reproductive: Exploring the Junction and Disjunction of Sexual and Reproductive 
Rights’ (2000) 4(2) HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 68, 71. 
37 Id., 71–72. 
38 Lottes, supra note 33, 380–382. 
39 Miller, supra note 34, 292. 
40 Id. 
41 Ryan, Living Wage, vii, from the American Federationist, 1898, cited in ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN’S 
WAGE (1990) at 10. 
42 ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN’S WAGE, 11.  
43 WILMA MEIKLE, TOWARDS A SANE FEMINISM 111 (1917). Over a century earlier, feminist philosopher Mary 
Wollstonecraft made comparable dignity-based arguments for the right of women to education, in A VINDICATION OF THE 
RIGHTS OF WOMAN (1792).  
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From the dignity of work to dignity at work, calls for equal pay for women have also 
at times been framed as issues of dignity.44 This suggests that sex discrimination can be 
characterised as an offense to dignity, an issue that has received much attention in 
feminist theories of workplace sexual harassment.45 In her ground-breaking Sexual 
Harassment of Working Women, Catherine MacKinnon conceptualised harassment as a 
form of sex discrimination, part of a broader pattern of institutionalised male 
domination/female subordination.46 However, more recently, an alternative and more 
gender-neutral theory of sexual harassment has shifted the focus to sexual harassment as 
a violation of the dignity of a person, albeit a harm that is primarily inflicted on women. 
For example, Anita Bernstein has argued that hostile environment sexual harassment is 
an indignity, and that as such, a “respectful person” standard, based on a Kantian theory 
of respect as recognition of each person’s inherent worth, is the appropriate doctrinal 
framing of sexual harassment.47 Rosa Ehrenreich similarly posits that workplace 
harassment is “a quintessential dignitary harm”, which she defines as “an insult to the 
dignity, autonomy and personhood of each victim”.48 This dignity paradigm is prevalent 
in European law and theory on workplace harassment, in line with the continent’s deeply 
rooted dignity-focused legal tradition.49 For example, the violation of dignity is a central 
element of sexual harassment under EU law.50 I return to the jurisprudence of dignity and 
sexual harassment, which speaks to feminist debates on sexual dignity more generally, 
below.   
 
II. DIGNITY IN SEXUAL VIOLENCE THEORY 
 
Turning now to sexual violence theory, in this Part I explore various dimensions of dignity 
as an interest underpinning rape’s prohibition, as evident in feminist accounts of rape’s 
harms and wrongfulness. My starting point is the observation that the evolution of sexual 
violence theory—from conservative to liberal to radical51—illustrates a gradual 
                                                   
 
44 See, e.g., Director General, International Labour Office, Time for Equality at Work (2003) International Labor 
Conference 91st session, report I(B): “equality in employment and occupation is important for the freedom, dignity and 
well-being of individuals” (25); Judy McGregor, Re-envisioning the Dignity of Women’s Work, in HUMAN DIGNITY: 
ESTABLISHING WORTH AND SEEKING SOLUTIONS (Edward Sieh and Judy McGregor eds., 2017), 184 (arguing that “much 
of women’s work globally has not crossed the divide between dignity and indignity”, given continuing income inequality).   
45 Note that in the US, the debate of “discrimination of women” vs “dignitary harm” has special significance because 
it corresponds to the two main legal remedies for workplace sexual harassment: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which 
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis (inter alia) of sex; and the dignitary torts.  
46 CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). 
47 Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV L REV 445 (1997). 
48 Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 
GEO L J 1, 16 (1999). 
49 Gabrielle S Friedman & James Q Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment Law: Discrimination 
Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM J EUR L 241, 266 (2003). 
50 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 Sep. 2002 amending Council Directive 
76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions. 
51 Adopting Keith Burgess-Jackson’s typology of three theories of rape: Rape and Persuasive Definition, 25 CAN. J. 
PHILOSOPHY 415, 443–52 (1995). 
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“democratization” of dignity.52 The harm of rape has historically been framed as an affront 
to (white, landholding) male dignity—by violating (trespassing on) another man’s wife or 
unmarried daughter (property) without his consent, the rapist undermined the patriarch’s 
authority and honour (sex within marriage, by definition, involved no such affront to 
dignity, regardless of whether the woman consented).53 In this conservative theory of rape, 
not only were women not seen as equal in dignity, but their bodies were objectified as sites 
of a harm done to men. 54 At most, a woman’s “honour”—her chastity, reputation and worth 
in the eyes of men—was incidentally implicated by rape. In time, a more liberal theory of 
rape emerged, which understands rape as an affront to the victim’s autonomy and dignity.55 
Radical feminism in turn has highlighted the gendered nature of rape, as an affront to the 
dignity of all women.56 This evolution can be understood as a “levelling up” process, with 
dignity and attendant rights of autonomy and equality gradually extended from man to the 
(qualified) woman57 to women as a group.58 Democratization of dignity as underlying the 
wrongfulness and harm of rape has gone hand in hand with doctrinal changes (for example, 
as to marital rape; the resistance requirement; evidential rules addressing rape myths at 
trial).59 Previous marginal cases—the rape of married women, black women, gay women, 
slutty women, passive women—are no longer marginal, as sexual dignity has been re-
theorised as universal, inherent and inviolable. Dignity has evolved in the process, from a 
narrow, patriarchal focus on individual honour, to something related to our very humanity, 
with both individual and gendered/communal dimensions. Here I explore these dimensions 
                                                   
 
52 I am drawing here on Waldron’s work on dignitas. Waldron suggests that surprising linkages can be drawn 
between the modern egalitarian understanding of dignity as universal and the ancient legal concept of dignitas. Dignitas 
was a decidedly inegalitarian concept, referring to the respect and honour due to certain institutions (eg states) or people 
(eg nobles) by virtue of their rank. Over time, there has been a ‘generalization of the respect and solicitude for dignity that 
was previously confined to a particular high and exclusive rank of humanity’: Waldron, supra note 18, at 232. C.c. James 
Whitman, Human Dignity in Europe and the United States, in Georg Nolte (ed), EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 
(Georg Nolte ed.,  2005) 108–24 (discussing dignity as an evolution of honour-based legal norms). 
53 Burgess-Jackson, supra note 51, at 443–44; cc JACK HARTNELL, MEDIEVAL BODIES: LIFE, DEATH AND ART IN THE 
MIDDLE AGES 251 (2019) (noting that prosecution for rape in the Middle Ages was “typically based on the degree to which 
a crime had transgressed shared male codes of honour and the limitations they placed on a woman’s social appeal to other 
men”). 
54 Tshabalala v State; Ntuli v State [2019] ZACC 48, 2020 (5) SA 1 [90] (Victor AJ concurring) (noting that 
“historically, women have been objectified in relation to the crime of rape, where the interest which was to be protected 
was not their human rights to dignity, equality, security or safety of the person, but rather their chastity or value as an 
object for their male owner”).  
55 Burgess-Jackson, supra note 51, 447 (noting that “[w]hat makes rape morally problematic—wrong, bad—to the 
liberal is … that as an action it bypasses the victim. The rapist, by failing to secure the victim’s consent to his sexual 
contact, treats her as an object for his use and therefore fails to respect her autonomy”). 
56 Id. at 448: ‘The radical … views rape as a kind of degradation, as an instance of class-based (in this case the classes 
are sexes) subordination’. 
57 Masiya v DPP [2007] ZACC 9 at [24], [28] (discussing the “gradual movement towards recognition of a female as 
the survivor of rape rather than other antiquated interests” and society’s changing understanding that “rape is criminal 
because it affects the dignity and personal integrity of women”). History demonstrates that qualification as a dignity-
bearing woman—that is, a “rapeable woman”—has depended, over time, not only on gender, but on factors of “virtue” 
(chastity), race, sexual orientation, occupation and more. 
58 Burgess-Jackson, supra note 51, 449–50 (arguing that “[t]o the conservative, rape is something a bad man does to 
another man; to the liberal, rape is something a bad man does to a woman; to the radical, rape is something men do to 
women”). 
59 These developments, and associated judicial dignity talk, are explored in Part 4 below.  
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of dignity in contemporary feminist rape theory in turn—dignity as honour; dignity as 
gendered/communal; dignity as personhood. 
 
A. Dignity, Honour and Humanity 
 
The term sexual indignity has long been used as a euphemism for rape, including in 
international humanitarian law. For example, the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda have both held that sexual violence falls within 
the category of “outrages upon personal dignity” as prohibited by Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions.60 And in the Akayesu judgment, the ICTY’s landmark decision 
defining the crime of rape under international law, the Tribunal declined to focus on “a 
mechanical description of objects and body parts” and instead highlighted the 
dehumanization experienced by rape victims: “rape is a violation of personal dignity”.61  
The dignity framing of wartime rape has been criticized by feminist writers, notably 
Rhonda Copelon, for diminishing the violent and gendered nature of most sexual crimes, 
while centring the harm of rape on how women are seen in society by men in terms of their 
sexual honour.62 Indeed, a patriarchal, dignity-as-honour approach is explicitly adopted in 
Article 27 of Geneva Convention IV, the only express reference in the Conventions to rape. 
The second paragraph of Article 27 states that women “shall be especially protected against 
any attack on their honour, in particular against rape …”. As Sellers and Rosenthal have 
argued, this paragraph seems to assume that “chastity and modesty are inherent qualities 
of women’s honour … and that women’s dignity equates with their sexual purity”.63 Such 
an understanding of rape as mere “indignity” and dignity as “honour” resonates with a 
conservative theory of rape and seems to grossly mischaracterize and understate the 
wrongfulness of sexual violence.64 
                                                   
 
60 Akayesu, supra note 2, [688]; Judgment, Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic (IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T), Trial 
Chamber, 22 February 2001 [161].  
61 Akayesu, supra note 2, [597]. 
62 Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 243 (1994). C.c. Patricia Viseur Sellers, The Context of Sexual Violence: Sexual Violence as Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE 
EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS, VOLUME I 298, fn 152 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia 
Swaak-Goldman  eds., 2000) (arguing that the “allusion to dignity or honour next to crimes of sexual assault de-
emphasizes the violent nature of most sexual crimes and again places sexual assault survivors in a position analogous to 
those subjected to moral defamation”); Shana Eaton, Sierra Leone: The Proving Ground for Prosecuting Rape as a War 
Crime, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 873, 912 (2004). 
63 Patricia Viseur Sellers & Indira Rosenthal, Rape and Other Sexual Violence, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY 350 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli eds., 2015). Importantly, the authors note that there 
have been no cases citing “attacks upon honour” as a basis for gender-based charges—the provision seems to be largely 
redundant, although its underlying assumptions may endure. The authors also note that the framing of rape as an attack on 
honour may resonate strongly in culturally conservative contexts and as such be useful in promoting observance of its 
prohibition. 
64 I acknowledge that cross-cultural perspectives could be brought to the “dignity as honour” debate, although these 
are beyond the scope of this Article: see, e.g., Man Yee Karen Lee, Universal Human Dignity: Some Reflections in the 
Asian Context, 3 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 23–4 (2008) (discussing the impact of an Asian perspective of “dignity as virtue” in 
Indian caselaw). 
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Despite these critiques, many feminist writers embrace the notion of dignity when 
describing the harm of wartime sexual violence.65 But in such cases, it appears that an 
understanding of dignity as personhood, rather than “dignity as honour”, is at play. 
Copelon, for example, writes of rape as attacking 
… the integrity of the woman as a person as well as her identity as a 
woman. It renders her … “homeless in her own body.” It strikes at a 
woman”s power, it seeks to degrade and destroy her; its goal is 
domination and dehumanization.66 
Far from reproducing a patriarchal or understated view of rape, “dignity as personhood” 
has been offered as a potentially humanising way to frame sexual violence, including 
wartime rape. For example, Kirsten Campbell has argued the Akayesu decision, with its 
emphasis on rape as a violation of dignity, correctly understands rape as both a traumatic 
violation of collective norms of humanity and as a repudiation of the victim as a member 
of that universal humanity.67 Similarly, Eleni Coundouriotis has argued that the Tribunal’s 
shift in focus from perpetrator action (penetration) to victim experience (dignity) 
recognizes that the injury of rape is to the person as a whole, not merely to the injured 
body.68 
 
B. Individual and Communal Sexual Dignity Interests 
 
Wartime sexual violence is variously classified, depending on the circumstances, as a grave 
breach of the Conventions, a crime against humanity and an act of genocide. Debates about 
the appropriate classification of wartime rape relate to a broader question about what 
individual and communal dignity interests might be at stake. For example, the classification 
of rape as a crime against humanity was widely heralded as a long overdue recognition in 
international law of women’s humanity. Naming rape a crime against humanity arguably 
amounts to legal recognition that rape violates the dignity of women, in that women’s 
bodies are a site of humanity; women are “identified … qua woman qua uniquely sexed 
and vulnerable as human”, and the male body no longer determines the sphere of 
humanity.69 
However, the legal tests for rape as a crime against humanity or an act of genocide, 
which require proof of rape as part of a systematic attack on a body of people, have also 
been criticized for resting on a problematic understanding of rape as a collective violation, 
rather than a violation of the autonomy and integrity of an individual woman’s body.70 
                                                   
 
65 Olivier Winants, The Interplay of Ethnicity, Gender and Sexual Violence during Wartime and in Coercive 
Interrogation: What Role for Human Dignity? 43 JURA FALCONIS 137, 173 (2006–2007). 
66 Copelon, supra note 62, 252. 
67 Kirsten Campbell, Rape as a ‘Crime Against Humanity’: Trauma, Law and Justice in the ICTY, 2 J. HUM. RTS. 
507, 510 (2003). 
68 Eleni Coundouriotis, “You Only Have Your Word:” Rape and Testimony, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 365 (2013). 
69 Debra Bergoffen, Toward a Politics of the Vulnerable Body, 18 HYPATIA 116, 118, 132 (2001). 
70 Katie C. Richey, Several Steps Sideways: International Legal Developments concerning War Rape and the Human 
Rights of Women, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 109 (2007); Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 379, 387 (1999). 
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Hilary Charlesworth has described this as the “inability of the law to properly name what 
is at stake”.71 Rape is a crime of violence against women, but by “fusing the bodily rights 
of women with the bodily rights of the polity”, the objectification of women’s bodies—as 
sites of abstract harm to a collective—is arguably perpetuated.72 On the other hand, radical 
sexual violence theory contends that rape must be recognized as not only harming 
individual victims, but also women as a group, women qua women.73 Rape is an injury to 
all women, a pattern that establishes and entrenches the belief that “women are “for” men: 
to be used, dominated, treated as objects”.74 In this way, rape represents a denial of the 
permanent and equal dignity of women, not just woman.75 
This ideological tension echoes a debate in sexual harassment theory as to whether 
dignity is expansive enough to express both individual interests and communal interests of 
women qua women76 (or, in the case of “genocidal rape”, a communal interest of ethnic 
women qua ethnic women77). For example, given that the subordination of women is an 
underlying cause of sexual harassment, Kathryn Abrams has argued that shifting the focus 
towards individual dignity harms and away from the collective harm to women is a 
problematic depoliticization of gender inequality:78  
Yes, harassment is a dignitary injury, but if we fail to appreciate that 
this dignitary injury is a function of, and connected to, other injuries 
within an unequal and hierarchical relationship, we miss much of 
what is morally and politically significant about the wrong. … Failing 
to highlight the fact that this humiliation arises from a context of 
systematic gender inequality individualizes the wrong and diminishes 
the imperative for responding to it. 
Abrams does not dispute that individual dignity is at stake when women are sexually 
harassed, but her focus is on the collective interests of women, which should not be 
                                                   
 
71 Charlesworth, supra note 70, 387. 
72 Richey, supra note 70, 112; Charlesworth, supra note 70, 387. Cc Copelon, supra note 62, 264 (arguing that 
“surfacing gender”—emphasizing the gendered nature of rape in war—is critical to surfacing women as full subjects, 
rather than objects, of sexual violence). 
73 Or, in the case of “genocidal rape”, a communal interest of ethnic women qua ethnic women: Winants, supra note 
65, 173 (noting that although some feminist writers adopt a dominant Western view in debating rape as genocidal, “[a]s 
shown by the Rwanda and Yugoslavia experience, women do care about their ethnical alienation or destruction resulting 
from sexual violence and it is important to recognize this”).  
74 Jean Hampton, Defining Wrong and Defining Rape, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 
ON RAPE  135 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999); cc SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND 
RAPE (1975) (Brownmiller likewise frames rape as threatening the dignity of all women); CAHILL, supra note 5, 193. 
75 This argument relates to feminist objections to pornography and “revenge porn” as legitimating certain societal 
attitudes to women and thereby sending a message that women are not equal: see, e.g., CATHERINE MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley, Image-Based Sexual Abuse, 37(3) OXFORD J OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 53 (2017). 
76 Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 
GEO. L.J. 1 (1999); Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment Law: 
Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241 (2003). 
77 See Winants, supra note 65, 173 (noting that although some feminist writers adopt a dominant Western view in the 
debate on genocidal rape, “[a]s shown by the Rwanda and Yugoslavia experience, women do care about their ethnical 
alienation or destruction resulting from sexual violence and it is important to recognize this”). 
78 Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998). 
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invisibilized. This is an important point, but a dignity framing of harassment (or rape) does 
not need to elide the discriminatory context of such behaviour. Rosa Ehrenreich has 
advocated for a pluralistic understanding of sexual harassment as an (individual) dignitary 
harm that occurs in a context of discrimination against women.79 By deemphasising the 
issue of gender, Ehrenreich argues that a dignity framing might correct the essentialist 
conception of sexual harassment as a special “women’s injury”.80 The debate, then, may be 
not so much about two mutually exclusive paradigms, as a dispute about emphasis. By 
shifting the focus from the particular lived experience of women, to the individual dignity 
injuries of people generally, the law’s expressive loyalty to women may be undermined—
the “fatal depoliticization” raised by Abrams. This leads Friedman and Whitman to wonder 
whether protecting both women and dignity “may be more than any society can realistically 
manage”.81 
Such zero-sum framing is mitigated by a more expansive conception of dignity, which 
is not necessarily an exclusively individual interest. It may be that an individualistic 
understanding of dignity—as is common in Western jurisprudence—is inadequate for this 
purpose, but other conceptions of dignity are possible. In Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
indigenous Māori culture, for example, sexual violence is seen as a violation of the sanctity 
of te whare tangata: the woman’s womb, womankind, the “house of humanity”. 
Accordingly, rape is framed as a transgression not only of the mana [prestige, status, 
birthright] of victims, but also of the mana of Māori Wahine [womankind] and therefore 
of the people, including past and future generations: 
Sexual violence within Māori understandings is an absolute violation 
of the mana of the person and the collective mana of whānau [family], 
hapū [clan] and iwi [tribe]. It is a violent transgression against a 
person’s whakapapa [genealogy] that reaches back to past generations 
and has direct impacts on future generations.82 
An understanding of mana as communal leads to a kaupapa Māori framing of sexual 
violence as an act causing both individual and collective harm.83 This is echoed in the work 
of Sarah Deer, a legal scholar and member of the Mvskoke nation, who advocates for the 
development of a new indigenous jurisprudence of rape. For Deer, this jurisprudence 
should be grounded in a uniquely indigenous understanding of rape as both an individual 
and communal experience, involving a violation of humanity by the “unlawful ‘invasion’ 
of the body, mind and spirit”—an understanding that has been mediated by the violence of 
                                                   
 
79 Ehrenreich, supra note 76, 4. 
80 Id. at 21 (framing sexual harassment as wrong “not because it wrongs women, but because such treatment would 
deeply wrong any human being, regardless of sex”). 
81 Friedman & Whitman, supra note 76, 271–74. 
82 Leonie Pihama et al., Māori Cultural Definitions of Sexual Violence, 7 SEXUAL ABUSE IN AUSTL. & N.Z. 43, 45, 48 
(2016). 
83 Id. at 48. For discussion of the character of the conceptual association between dignity and mana in Aotearoa New 
Zealand jurisprudence, see Mihiata Pirini and Anna High, Dignity and Mana in the ‘Third Law’ of Aotearoa New Zealand 
[forthcoming 2021]. 
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colonisation.84 While these two examples are by no means exhaustive of indigenous 
theories of sexual violence, they usefully illustrate that dignity can be understood as both 
individually and collectively implicated by sexual violence, whether the collective is an 
ethnic group, a gender or humanity at large. So understood, sexual dignity accommodates 
a pluralistic approach to gendered harms such as rape, one that neither invisibilizes nor 
essentializes women as victims. 
 
C. Integrity, Objectification, Diminishment and Autonomy 
 
Beyond highlighting both individual and group dimensions of sexual dignity, the 
indigenous rape theories above also illustrate an understanding of rape as transgressing 
against not only physical integrity or autonomous control of one’s body, but against 
personhood. This theme is echoed in feminist theory on sexual violence more broadly. 
Despite critiques of a dignity framing in contexts such as sexual harassment and wartime 
rape, a Kantian understanding of dignity—as the equal, permanent and inherent value of 
persons, which requires treating persons as ends/subjects, not as means/objects—often 
imbues feminist articulations of the distinctive wrongfulness and harms of rape.85 
Writing in 1977, Carolyn Shafer and Marilyn Frye argued that disrespecting 
personhood, by the instrumental use of another against her will, is the moral wrong at the 
heart of rape: 
[H]e is using her in furtherance of ends other than hers. Moreover, the 
ends for which he is using her body are ends which are contrary to 
hers, given that her ends include the maintenance of her bodily 
integrity and health. The use of a person in the advancement of 
interests contrary to its own is a limiting case of disrespect. It reveals 
the perception of the person simply as an object which can serve 
some purpose … it conveys to her that she is seen as an object with a 
sexual function … 86 
In other words, by non-consensual sex, the rapist denies the victim’s autonomy and thus 
personhood, casting her as a mere object for his use. More recently, Ann Cahill’s discussion 
of rape as an embodied experience echoes this understanding of rape as denial and 
destruction of the victim’s subjectivity: “In the act of rape, the assailant reduces the victim 
to a nonperson. He … denies the victim the specificity of her … own being”.87 Indeed, such 
opposition to the sexual objectification of women by men is typically at the heart of 
                                                   
 
84 SARAH DEER, THE BEGINNING AND END OF RAPE: CONFRONTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN NATIVE AMERICA 
(University of Minnesota Press 2015) 114. On the Māori experience of sexual violence as mediated by colonial trauma, see 
Michelle Erai, Criminal Sittings—Rape in the Colony, New Zealand, 1862, 24 J. HIST. SOC. 186 (2011). 
85 For discussion of conservative/patriarchal theory of rape as harm to male (father/husband) dignity, see Burgess-
Jackson, supra note 51, 444 (“it is an affront to his personal dignity; it fails to respect his domain; and it may cost him 
economically”). 
86 Shafer & Frye, supra note 5, 341. 
87 CAHILL, supra note 5, 192. Elsewhere Cahill describes rape as “undermining the possibility (at least temporarily 
…) of the victim’s personhood” (194) and as the nullification of the victim’s “embodied, sexually differentiated 
subjectivity” (193). 
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feminist politics, perhaps most famously in the works of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea 
Dworkin.88 It is also strikingly congruent with Kant’s writing on sex, which he saw as 
inherently (albeit mutually) objectifying.89 In her philosophical account of the modern 
feminist concept of objectification, Martha Nussbaum has identified “instrumentality, 
connected in a Kantian way to denials of autonomy and subjectivity”—that is, treating 
others as means to an end, rather than ends in themselves—as the core wrong of sexual 
objectification.90 
Other examples of dignity-focused articulations of the wrongfulness of rape abound. 
Consider, for example, this account from law professor and rape survivor Lynne 
Henderson: 
[R]ape denies that you are a person, that you exist. … When a 
woman’s existence just does not matter, intercourse becomes rape. 
Thus, the important factor is non-existence. … Thus I also disagree 
with theorists who see rape as an invasion of bodily integrity or 
privacy or personal autonomy. It is those things, too, but it is more.91 
John Gardner has likewise argued that rape unequivocally instantiates the central moral 
importance of the Kantian argument against the “the sheer use of a person” and that this is 
the fundamental element of rape’s wrongfulness: “all sheer use of human beings, all 
treatment of them merely as means is abuse; and rape is the central case of such abuse”.92  
Importantly, a Kantian conception of dignity assumes dignity’s permanence; because 
dignity derives from our humanity, it is intrinsic and permanent. As such, dignity is not 
actually degraded by wrongful actions. This is highlighted by Jean Hampton, who has 
argued that the moral injury of wrongful acts such as rape is diminishment: the messaging 
and appearance of dignity’s degradation.93 By objectifying his victim, the rapist represents 
himself as master and the victim as inferior object: “distressingly, the rape is a kind of 
event that seeks to make that diminished status a reality. The woman is used as though she 
is an object, and so she is thought to be one”.94 
This is not to deny that the wrong of sexual objectification—diminishment of the 
dignity of personhood—can be subjectively experienced as various harms, including 
                                                   
 
88 See, generally, Nussbaum, supra note 5, 250. Dworkin and MacKinnon’s proposed legal definition of pornography 
(Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, ff 1 (1984)) hinges on the treatment of 
women as sexual objects. 
89 See IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS, cited in Barbara Herman, Could it be Worth Thinking About Kant on 
Sex and Marriage?, in A MIND OF ONE’S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND OBJECTIVITY (Louise Antony & 
Charlotte Witt eds., 1993) 49–67, 60: “If then a man wishes to satisfy his desire, and a woman hers, they stimulate each 
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nature of the other”. 
90 Nussbaum, supra note 5, 268. 
91 Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 193, 226–27 (1988). 
92 Gardner, supra note 5, 16. For a philosophical account of the moral wrong of using persons, see Nancy Davis, 
Using Persons and Common Sense, 94 ETHICS 387 (1984). 
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opposed to a standalone principle from which rights derive. Conor O’Mahony has argued that the idea of a “right to 
dignity”—which implies that dignity is a state to be lost or achieved—is logically inconsistent with the concept of inherent 
human dignity: see Conor O’Mahony, There is No Such Thing as a Right to Dignity, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 551 (2012).  
94 Hampton, supra note 74, 135. 
 
 Sexual Dignity in Rape Law  
 
17 
feelings of shame and degradation of selfhood, as indicated by Henderson’s account 
above.95 Robin West has set out a compelling account of the harms to selfhood involved in 
being treated as a sexual object, describing sexual assault as causing 
… the death of a liberal and individualistic conception of subjectivity: 
there can be no sense of self-possession when the self has been 
invaded by the desires, pleasures, wills, and actions of another, and 
stronger, and life-threatening, human being. … The harm caused by 
invasive terror is ultimately the cessation of selfhood. The self is 
objectified, and when that occurs, it ceases to exist.96 
West’s description of rape assumes a nexus between integrity of the body and integrity of 
the self.97 Such accounts of rape suggest that despite the law’s emphasis on consent in 
defining rape, rape’s wrongfulness and harms are not fully expressed by a focus on 
autonomy alone. Autonomy is one aspect of personhood, and denial of autonomy is one 
aspect of the rapist’s dignity-denying objectification of his victim, but subjectivity is also 
at stake when people are used as mere means to an end. This leads Nicola Lacey to argue 
that a focus on autonomy as the core of rape 
… provides a distorted or (at the very least) partial representation of 
the real wrong of rape, in that it displaces the embodied and affective 
aspects of the offence … the language of embodied existence—of 
pain, shame, loss of self-esteem, the sense of violation and 
objectification—find no place within formal legal categories.98 
 
D. An Emerging Feminist Account of Sexual Dignity 
 
Based on the foregoing survey, it is possible to identify an emerging consensus in sexual 
violence theory on the meaning of dignity as a value underpinning the wrongfulness and 
harm of rape. There are a number of key dimensions to this core feminist account of sexual 
dignity: 
(1) First, feminists reject sexual dignity as merely reputation or honour. Such a 
patriarchal conception of dignity objectifies women’s bodies as sites of harm done to men’s 
honour; at best, a woman’s dignity and thus rapeability is contingent on her perceived 
respectability in the eyes of men. This reproduces a sexual normative hierarchy, in which 
                                                   
 
95 I use the term selfhood here, in contrast to personhood, to refer to one’s concrete, subjective experience of one’s 
own (abstract, objective) personhood. For a useful discussion of the distinction between undermining a person’s dignity, 
and thereby causing hurt or distress to that person, in the context of hate speech, see JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN 
HATE SPEECH (2012), 105–44. 
96 ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 104, 109 (1999).  
97 C.c.Campbell, supra note 67, 509; CAHILL, supra note 5, 132: “Rape, in its total denial of the victim’s agency, will, 
and personhood, can be understood as a denial of intersubjectivity itself … The self is at once denied and, by the totality of 
this denial, stilled, silenced, overcome”. 
98 Lacey, supra note 5, at 60–1. Lacey does not draw on dignity explicitly, but her “sexual integrity” analytical 
framework echoes the themes and meanings of dignity discussed in this article: “a recognition of the value of integrity 
invites the incorporation of implications of sexual abuse such as shame, loss of self-esteem, objectification, 
dehumanization” (at 65). 
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the “dishonourable” woman—the unchaste, the deviant, the shameful other—is exiled as 
non-dignified. Sexual dignity is also more than physical integrity. The right to control 
access to one’s body is a dimension of dignity, one that is emphasized by a liberal 
understanding of rape as “violence not sex”, a violation of bodily/psychological integrity 
rather than of chastity or honour. But there is more to sexual dignity than this physical 
dimension. Dignity posits the inherent and equal worth of all by virtue of personhood; it is 
this personhood, humanity or subjectivity that is denied when a rapist disregards non-
consent and thereby objectifies the victim. Rape not only impinges on the right to freedom 
from physical violence, but also on the freedom to flourish as a self-defined, subjective 
self. In this analysis, just as rape, as a denial of subjectivity, is understood to be intrinsically 
different to mere physical assault, sexual dignity is not only about physical integrity, but 
personhood.99 
(2) This raises the question of how dignity and autonomy differ. Autonomy is an aspect 
of our personhood, and the rapist’s objectification of his victim fundamentally relates to 
his disregard for her autonomy. But feminist theory understands sexual dignity as a more 
capacious concept than autonomy that better expresses the multiplicity of rape’s 
wrongfulness and harms. When a victim is raped and her autonomy over her body is denied, 
there is arguably also a message of degradation and dehumanizing objectification inherent 
in that denial, which “sexual dignity” is capable of acknowledging.  
(3) From an understanding of dignity as relating to personhood, it follows that sexual 
dignity is both equal and permanent. Rape, understood as an affront to sexual dignity, is 
viewed as wrongful regardless of victim’s race, chastity, occupation, orientation or sexual 
preferences, because dignity inheres equally in all. “Dignity as honour” can be lost and 
rape victims stigmatized as “damaged goods”. But part of the expressive potential of 
dignity as personhood is to highlight the inherent and permanent worth of all: that the 
rapist’s sheer use of his victim as an object may send a message of degradation, but does 
not in fact transform his victim from subject to object; that a rape victim may experience 
her violation as shameful or as “the cessation of selfhood”, but her dignity-bearing self 
endures. 
(4) Finally, sexual dignity allows for a pluralistic understanding of rape, as a harm to 
both individual victims (with diverse lived experiences, including male and non-
conforming persons) and as occurring in a discriminatory context (with women 
disproportionately affected). Dignity can be used to frame the harm of sexual violence in 
such a way that women are neither essentialized (by perpetuating their sexuality as a site 
of harm) or invisibilized (by obscuring the gendered harm of rape).100 This is because 
dignity is capacious enough to encompass both individual and communal dimensions: just 
as rape denies the dignity of each victim, so too rape denies the equal dignity and status of 
                                                   
 
99 This understanding of sexual dignity resonates with the idea of “free self-development”, rooted in German 
liberalism, which underpins the German law of personality, and has influenced the interpretation of the dignity clause in 
Article 1 of the German Basic Law, including in the context of workplace harassment: see, generally, Friedman and 
Whitman, supra n 49, 256. 
100 Sarah Deibler, Rape by Any Other Name: Mapping the Feminist Legal Discourse Regarding Rape in Conflict onto 
Transitional Justice in Cambodia, 32(2) AM U INT’L L REV 501, 536 (2015) (discussing essentialisation, and noting that 
this tends also to occlude men’s bodies as a site of sexual harm) and 528 (discussing invisibilisation). 
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women qua women. Rape is an injury to all women, a pattern that establishes and 
entrenches the subordination of women to men as objects of sexual use.  
 
III. DIGNITY IN SEXUAL VIOLENCE CASELAW 
 
The language of dignity is common in legal discourse across subdisciplines, from human 
rights and humanitarian law to bio-ethics and environmental law; however, as noted at the 
outset, it should not be assumed that the same understanding or definition of dignity applies 
across these different contexts. A useful way to unpack “dignity” in a particular legal 
context is to take a bottom-up approach, based on practical examples of its deployment.101 
To that end, this Part critically reviews the deployment of dignity by judges addressing 
criminal sexual offending. What conceptions of dignity are apparent in the caselaw, and do 
these align with the feminist account of sexual dignity surveyed above?  
This is not an exhaustive review of dignity talk in judicial decisions about rape. 
However, as a first step to understanding how dignity is used by judges in this context, my 
research yielded a rich body of materials to draw upon, sufficient to illustrate how judges 
across the common law world tend to use the concept of sexual dignity. I searched the 
caselaw of twelve jurisdictions—Australia, Botswana, Canada, Eswatini, India, Namibia, 
New Zealand, South Africa, the UK, the USA and Zimbabwe, plus the European Court of 
Human Rights—for criminal cases using the term dignity in discussing rape or other forms 
of sexual assaults.102 Thematic textual analysis of the judgments was carried out, using 
content coding and with reference to key aspects of the theoretical framework outlined 
above; the discussion that follows is organized according to those key themes. 
 
A. Honour, Integrity, Personhood, Non-Objectification 
 
The normative authority of dignity was illustrated by its recurring use as a means of 
emphasizing the gravity of rape and the need for an effective response, either at 
sentencing103 or in sentencing appeals.104 This was often done without explication or 
                                                   
 
101 Neal, supra note 4, 121. 
102 Jurisdictions were selected based mainly on three criteria: (i) a common law system; (ii) English as primary civic 
language; and (iii) population over 10 million. The European Court of Human Rights was included on the basis of its 
jurisdiction over the UK, although applications against other states were also searched. Four nations with populations less 
than 10 million were included: Botswana, Eswatini and Namibia, on the basis of citations in South African jurisprudence, 
and New Zealand, due to the author’s affiliation. The searches were generally not limited by time or court, although in 
some jurisdictions it was only possible to search superior courts. In each jurisdiction, the following searches were carried 
out: (i) “sexual dignity”; (ii) “dignity w/s sex”; (iii) “dignity AND rape”; (iv) “dignity AND consent AND sex”. Results 
were then manually reviewed for relevance. 
103 See, e.g., State v Dibotelo [2008] BWHC 195 (High Court of Botswana) (“Rape … is a vicious violation of a 
woman’s dignity and the Courts ought not treat it with kid gloves unnecessarily”); R v Drain (2009) HC Auckland CRI-
2007-004-9065, 18 November 2009 (“Not only did your acts violate your sister physically, they also violated her dignity as 
a person. Such offending is very serious”); R v DWB [1998] NSJ No 198 (Nova Scotia Supreme Court) (discussing 
aggravating factors as demonstrating “the disdain you must have felt for her own sexual dignity and worth as a human 
being”). 
104 See, e.g., R v Arcand 2010 ABCA 363, 499 AR 1 (guideline sentencing judgment, noting that “non-consensual 
sexual intercourse under any circumstances constitutes a profound violation of a person’s dignity, equality, security of the 
person and sexual autonomy”); State of Andhra Pradesh v Bodem Sundara Rao LNIND 1995 SC 953 (finding the High 
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elaboration, but in other cases it was possible to identify various conceptions of dignity at 
play. For example, writing in the Supreme Court of India in 1980, Justice Krishna Iyer 
opined that “rape for a woman is deathless shame and must be dealt with as the gravest 
crime against human dignity”.105 In the same court in 2003, Justice Arijit Pasayat described 
sexual violence as, for a woman, 
… a serious blow to her supreme honour and offend[ing] her self-
esteem and dignity. It degrades and humiliates the victim. … A rapist 
not only causes physical injuries but more indelibly leaves a scar on 
the most cherished possession of a woman i.e. her dignity, honour, 
reputation and not the least her chastity.106 
These dicta suggest a patriarchal “dignity as honour” construct at odds with the idea of 
sexual dignity supported by feminist sexual violence theory. This accords with the findings 
of Bajpai and Mendiratta, who in their study of sexism in rape cases noted that the Indian 
judiciary has frequently “placed a premium on the notion of “honour and chastity”“.107 
More commonly, dignity was associated with physical security or 
bodily/psychological integrity.108 Bodily integrity was often listed alongside other 
concepts—privacy, autonomy and equality—as a cluster of related rights or interests 
associated with dignity.109 This was expressly described by the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa: 
                                                   
 
Court erred in reducing sentence for violent rape of a child, and noting that such crimes “are an affront to the human 
dignity of society”); Mukesh v State for NCT of Delhi LNIND 2017 SC 25 [147] (noting that “whenever such grave 
violations of human dignity come to fore, an unknown sense of insecurity and helplessness grabs the entire society, women 
in particular, and the only succour people look for, is the State to take command of the situation and remedy it 
effectively”); Chapman v State 1997 (3) SA 341 (Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa) (confirming sentence of 14 
years for three counts of rape, noting that rape “is a very serious offence, constituting as it does a humiliating, degrading 
and brutal invasion of the privacy, the dignity and the person of the victim”); Dempsey v R [2013] NZCA 297 (quashing 
the minimum period of imprisonment, noting that “the appellant’s predatory and persistent behaviour towards a young 
woman who he callously violated and for whose dignity he showed a complete lack of respect … requires condemnation”).  
105 Rafiq v State of UP (1980) 4 SCC 262. 
106 State of Punjab v Ramdev Singh LNIND 2003 SC 1106. Cc Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam v Chakraborty (1996) SCC 
(1) 490; State of Madhya Pradesh v Santosh Kumar (2006) 2 MLJ (Crl) 1239, 6 (describing rape as inflicting “the deep 
sense of some deathless shame” and robbing the victim of her dignity); Shyam Narain v State of NCT of Delhi (2013) (7) 
SCC 77 (describing rape as “dehumanis[ing] the woman by attacking her body and ruining her chastity”) (emphases 
added). 
107 G.S. Bajpai & Raghav Mendiratta, Gender Notions in Judgments of Rape Cases: Facing the Disturbing Reality, 60 
J. INDIAN L. INST. 298, 302 (2018).  
108 See, e.g., Newsom v State 533 P 2d 904 (Alaska 1975) (describing rape as “a desecration of the victim’s person 
which is a vital part of her sanctity and dignity as a human being”); Radebe v S 2019 (2) SACR 381 (High Court of 
South Africa) (discussing rape as an offence against dignity which “per se equates to the most degrading and invasive of 
assaults on both the physical integrity and the psyche of the individual”) [emphases added]. 
109 See, e.g., R v Accused (CA265/88) [1989] 1 NZLR 643 (CA) (noting that all cases of sexual violation are an act of 
“violation to the body of another involving at the very least an invasion of privacy and loss of personal dignity”); R v 
Hutchinson 2014 SCC 19, [2014] 1 SCR 346 (referring to “personal autonomy, dignity and physical integrity” as the 
values protected by sexual assault laws); R v M (GO) (1990) 54 CCC (3d) 79 (Northwest Territories Supreme Court, 
Canada) (describing rape as “a crime against human dignity. Indeed, it is the invasion of one’s body in demeaning 
circumstances. It is the negation of the important value of a human being, one’s physical integrity and privacy”); R v 
Leary (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Kirby ACJ and Campbell and James JJ, 8 October 1993) 
(describing rape as “the invasion of human dignity and privacy”); SM v Croatia (2019) 68 EHRR 7 (describing rape as 
threatening “human dignity and essential aspects of private life”); Masiya v DPP (Pretoria) [2007] ZACC 9, 2007 (5) 
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Often, with impunity, men forcibly violate women’s bodies, privacy, 
dignity and self-worth, freedom, and the right to be treated with equal 
regard. In short, rape of women and children violates a cluster of 
interlinked fundamental rights treasured by our Constitution.110   
This “cluster of rights” approach suggests a conception of dignity as involving more 
than physical integrity or autonomy over one’s body. This came through in judgments 
which spoke of dignity as something associated not merely with the physical, but with 
one’s personhood, humanity or subjectivity.111 For example, Tate JA writing in the 
Supreme Court of Victoria (Australia) in 2018 described rape as revealing “a reckless 
disregard for [the victim’s] humanity and her dignity as a person of inherent moral 
value”.112 Similarly, in the High Court of South Africa in 2019, Spilg J reasoned that rape 
is not merely a physical assault, but an assault on dignity. This led him to reject, at 
sentencing, the appellant’s proposition that a lack of physical injuries results in a “less 
serious” rape.113 This understanding of rape as implicating dignity, not merely the physical 
body, also came through in Tshabalala v State; Ntuli v State, where the South African 
Constitutional Court relied on the constitutional value of dignity to reject the “misguided 
and misinformed view that rape is a crime purely about sex”.114 This led the Court to reject 
the applicants’ argument that under common law, rape is an instrumentality offence which 
can only be committed by a male using his own genitalia and not by those acting as 
lookouts with a common purpose. 
Relating to sexual dignity as personhood, many judges used dignity to denounce the 
rapist’s use of the victim as a mere sexual object: 
[Rape is an] affront to the dignity and worth of its victims, [the] 
dehumanizing reduction of women to the status of mere objects.115 
[Finding that the rapist had disregarded the victim’s dignity, the court 
went on to say that the victim] was not your chattel; she was not your 
thing that you could do with whatever you pleased.116 
                                                   
 
SA 30 (“The object of the criminalization of [rape] is to protect the dignity, sexual autonomy and privacy of women and 
young girls”) (emphases added). 
110 F v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZACC 37, 2012 (1) SA 536. 
111 See, e.g., Mathlo [2008] BWCA 35 (Botswana High Court) (describing rape as “a violation of the personality of 
the victim … an invasion of her dignity and of the sanctity of her body”); Masiya (n 109) (positing that “[rape constitutes 
an] invasion of the dignity and the person of the survivor”); Griffin v State 583 NE 2d 191 (Ind Ct App 1991) (describing 
rape as not only a physical attack but “also an affront to her personal and sexual dignity”); State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh 
(1996) SCC (2) 384 (discussing rape as a violation of human dignity and as “often destructive of the whole personality of 
the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female”) 
(emphases added).  
112 Turner v The Queen [2018] VSCA 24 (15 February 2018). Cc DWB (supra note 103).  
113 Radebe, supra note 108, [24]–[26].  
114 Tshabalala, supra note 54, [45]. 
115 Magagula v R [2010] 32 (Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) Supreme Court). 
116 NPA v Western Australia [2018] WASCA 131 (2 August 2018). 
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To engage in sexual acts without the consent of another person is to 
treat him or her as an object and negate his or her human dignity.117 
The treatment of a child [as an object of sexual gratification] is an 
attempt to deny her basic human dignity. In the eyes of the adult, the 
child is reduced to being a nameless thing.118 
Condemnation of rape as a rejection of the victim’s humanity infuses the following 
passage from the India Supreme Court, in the infamous Delhi bus gang-rape/murder case: 
It is absolutely obvious that the accused persons had found an object 
for enjoyment in her … after ravishing her, [they] thought it to be just 
a matter of routine to throw her along with her friend out of the bus 
and crush them. The casual manner with which she was treated and 
the devilish manner in which they played with her identity and dignity 
is humanly inconceivable. It sounds like a story from a different 
world where humanity has been treated with irreverence.119 
If sexual dignity is more capacious than honour and physical integrity, then rape is 
understood as threatening not only freedom from violence, but freedom to live as a self-
defined subject. In this vein, L’Heureux-Dubé J in the Supreme Court of Canada has 
analogized from hate speech to rape, in that both impact “the individual’s sense of self-
worth and acceptance”.120 Her understanding of dignity as selfhood is echoed in Canadian 
jurisprudence on dignity generally, which encompasses not only negative “freedom from” 
rights, but the positive freedom to flourish as a person with “physical and psychological 
integrity and empowerment”.121 
 
B. Dignity, Autonomy and Consent 
 
In Rusk v State, a decision of Maryland’s Court of Appeals, Judge Wilner (dissenting) 
famously criticized rape law’s resistance requirement: 
If the appellant had desired, and Pat had given, her wallet instead of 
her body, there would be no question about appellant’s guilt of 
robbery. … No one would seriously contend that because she failed to 
raise a hue and cry she had consented to the theft of her money. Why 
                                                   
 
117 Mabior 2012 SCC 47, [2012] 2 SCR 584. 
118 R v EMW 2011 NSCA 87, 308 NSR (2d) 15. 
119 Mukesh, supra note 104. 
120 R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme [1991] 2 SCR 577 [150], citing Dickson CJ in R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697. 
121 Law v Canada [1999] 1 SCR 497. In the US Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy famously adopted a similarly 
positive (i.e. freedom to) conception of dignity, describing ‘the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life’ as central to liberty and personal dignity (Casey v Planned Parenthood 
(1992) 505 US 833 at 851). 
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then is such life-threatening action necessary when it is her personal 
dignity that is being stolen?122 
This critique was echoed by Justice Venters’ dissent in Jenkins v Commonwealth, a 
Kentucky Supreme Court case interpreting a sexual misconduct statute as requiring 
physical force or threat thereof. Venters J argued this misinterpreted a statute intended to 
criminalize acts which “reprehensibly … deprive a victim of her right to say “no” and the 
sexual dignity that goes with that right”.123 
Both Wilner and Venters JJ seem to use dignity in these passages for its rhetorical 
power, as a way of emphasising what is at stake when rape law, specifically rules around 
consent, fails to meaningfully protect autonomy. This presumed nexus between autonomy 
and dignity was evident in a number of significant decisions on the legal meaning of 
consent. In Ewanchuk, the Canadian Supreme Court identified dignity and autonomy as 
the core values underpinning the criminalization of unwanted touching: 
Having control over who touches one’s body, and how, lies at the 
core of human dignity and autonomy. The inclusion of assault and 
sexual assault in the Code expresses society’s determination to protect 
the security of the person from any non-consensual contact or threats 
of force … It follows that any intentional but unwanted touching is 
criminal.124   
The Court went on to reject an “implied consent” approach to determining consent. Such 
use of dignity and autonomy as a justificatory lens for reforming various aspects of consent 
law was apparent in a number of other jurisdictions, including New Zealand (affirmative 
consent),125  Australia (recklessness as to consent)126 and the European Court of Human 
Rights (resistance requirement).127 Returning to Canada, in Mabior, a leading decision on 
HIV exposure as sexual assault, the Supreme Court again expressly tied reform of consent 
law to dignity, explaining that Canadian law is interpreted by reference to the values of 
                                                   
 
122 406 A 2d 624, 633 (Ct Spec App Md 1979). The resistance requirement in Maryland at the time required that the 
victim resisted or that failure to do so was due to the threat of force/violence. 
123 496 SW 3d 435, 471 (2016). 
124 Ewanchuk [1999] 1 SCR 330 [28]. Cc R v Park [1995] 2 SCR 836 (criticizing the common law approach to 
consent, which reinforces the view that sex is consensual in the absence of communicated non-consent, as perpetuating 
“social stereotypes that have historically victimized women and undermined their equal right to bodily integrity and human 
dignity” (at [38]). 
125 See Christian v R [2016] NZCA 450 [49] (relying on the R v Ewanchuk (n 124) dignity passage to support an 
interpretation of the sexual violence statutory provisions as requiring an active expression of consent to ground a 
reasonable belief in consent). 
126 R v Kitchener (1993) 29 NSWLR 696, (NSW Court of Criminal Appeal) (Kirby J concurring) (agreeing that 
failure to advert at all to the possibility that the complainant was not consenting satisfied a mens rea requirement of 
‘recklessness’, based on statutory language and precedent, but also noting a dignity-based policy argument supporting the 
outcome, in that ‘sexual intercourse with another, without the consent of that other, amounts to an affront to that other’s 
human dignity’ and that as such, indifference to consent is plainly reckless in our society today). 
127 MC v Bulgaria (2005) 40 EHRR 20 (referencing international obligation to ensure rape laws protect women’s 
dignity, in holding that Bulgarian law, which required active resistance on the part of the victim to found a rape 
prosecution, failed to adequately protect the autonomy of individuals, and was therefore a breach of victims’ Convention 
right to freedom from inhumane or degrading treatment (art 3) and respect for private and family life (Article 8)).  
 
Sexual Dignity in Rape Law 
 
24 
autonomy, equality and dignity.128 In light of those values, Canada’s “formerly narrow view 
of consent” had been broadened over time, for example by abolition of the “hue and cry” 
rule and rejection of rape myths that had previously operated to “systematically bias[] the 
trial process in favour of finding consent”. 129 The Court expressly linked a progressive 
consent approach to a modern understanding of sexual assault as “wrong because it denies 
the victim’s dignity as a human being” by “treat[ing] him or her as an object”.130  
 
C. Dignity as Permanent and Equal 
 
Many judges spoke of dignity as being irreparably “destroyed”, “shattered” or “buried” by 
sexual violence, suggesting a conception of dignity as something impermanent such as 
reputation or honour.131 This sense of impermanence also came through in references to 
dignity as associated with physical security or bodily/psychological integrity, which was 
spoken of as being “violated”, “invaded”, “negated”, “obliterated” or “desecrated” by 
rape.132  
By contrast, cases which expressed dignity as associated with personhood and non-
objectification tended to use terms like “affront to”, “disregard”, and “attempt to deny” 
when discussing rape and dignity, suggesting an understanding of dignity as permanent 
and inviolable.133 This permanence was expressly discussed in the United States Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeal, in a case dealing with sexually exploitative photos of children: 
The pornographic photographer subordinates the humanity of his 
subject to the sexuality of the subject. The humanity of the subject is 
not eliminated; how could it be? Indeed the interest of the 
                                                   
 
128 Mabior, supra note 117, [43], [44]. 
129 Id. at [45], [46].  
130 Id. at [45], [48]. Importantly, the Mabior Court failed to engage explicitly with the connection between 
objectification and HIV exposure. As such, difficult questions about whether failure to disclose risk of HIV transmission is 
rightly treated as sexual assault, rather than assault or a separate non-disclosure offence, were side-stepped. Further 
analysis of the potential impact of a sexual dignity framework on the issue of HIV non-disclosure would be worthwhile. 
131 See, e.g., S v Oxorub [2015] NAHCMD 171 (High Court of Namibia) [17] (arguing that “no length of custodial 
sentence can restore the dignity of those women and child girls”); R v Causby [1984] 17 A Crim R 461 (Tasmanian Court 
of Criminal Appeal) (noting that forced non-consensual fellatio “can only be described as … destructive of the human 
dignity of the victim”); Shyam Narain (n 106) (describing the dignity of a rape victim as “shattered”; going on to say that 
rape “is a monstrous burial of her dignity in the darkness”) (emphases added). 
132 See, e.g., Batsile [2008] BWHC 315 (High Court of Botswana) (“[rape is] invasive of the dignity, emotional, 
physical and psychological integrity”); R v McCraw [1991] 3 SCR 72 (“[rape is] the violation of the bodily integrity of a 
woman [and an] affront to human dignity”); K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (Constitutional Court of 
South Africa) (describing rape as an infringement of “dignity and security of the person”); Aydin v Turkey App no 
23178/94 (Commission Decision, 25 September 1997) (noting rape’s incompatibility with human dignity, and describing 
rape as “strik[ing] at the heart of the victim’s physical and moral integrity”); R v Billam [1986] 1 WLR 349 (CA) 
(describing rape as an “indignity” which inflicts “emotional and psychological trauma; it may be described as a violation 
which in effect obliterates the personality of the victim”); Newsom, supra note 108 (emphases added). 
133 See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 111; Turner, supra note 112; EMW, supra note 118; NPA, supra note 116; cc R v 
JED [2007] VSC 348 (21 September 2007) (describing a sexual assault as having been carried out “with profound 
contempt for her dignity as a human being”); McCraw, supra note 132 (opining that “it is hard to imagine a greater 
affront to human dignity than rape”); Dempsey v R [2013] NZCA 297 (“…he callously violated [the victim and for her] 
dignity he showed a complete lack of respect”); N v T 1994 (1) SA 862 (High Court of South Africa) (“Rape is … [an] act 
in which the aggressor treats with utter contempt the dignity and feeling of his victim”) (emphases added). 
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pornographer is in the human person treated as sexual object. From a 
feminist perspective, this reduction of humanness has been seen as a 
male offense. … But whether the person is male or female, the 
essential operation is the same: an assault upon the humanity of the 
person pictured, making that person a mere means serving the 
voyeur’s purpose.134  
If dignity is understood as contingent on humanity, rather than reputation or physical 
state, it follows that dignity is not only permanent, but equally inherent in all people, 
regardless of external factors such as race, orientation, chastity or occupation. This view 
was expressed powerfully by the Supreme Court of Canada in a case involving the sexual 
violation of an Indigenous sex worker who died from her injuries: 
Our criminal justice system holds out a promise to all Canadians: 
everyone is equally entitled to the law’s full protection and to be 
treated with dignity, humanity, and respect. Ms. Gladue was no 
exception. She was a mother, a daughter, a friend, and a member of 
her community. Her life mattered. She was valued. She was 
important. She was loved. Her status as an Indigenous woman who 
performed sex work did not change any of that in the slightest.135 
The equality dimension of dignity was similarly emphasized in a number of sentencing 
cases, to refute arguments that certain victims are less impacted by rape. For example, in 
R v Leary, in the New South Wales Court of Appeal, Kirby ACJ wrote separately to concur 
with the sentencing judge’s rejection of a line of cases from Victoria in which the rape 
victim’s occupation as a prostitute was considered a mitigating factor: “prostitutes, male 
or female, were entitled to the same protection of the law as any other citizen. They have 
their human dignity and their privacy …”.136 Likewise in R v M (GO), Boilard J in the 
Northwest Territories Supreme Court began by noting that “rape is a crime against human 
dignity”, and as such its gravity 
… does not vary in accordance with the colour of the skin of the 
victim, her cultural background or the place of her residence. The 
progress of civilization and science during the 20th century has taught 
us that the human race shares the same ancestors and that we are 
equals and entitled to the same rights and obligations because of our 
human condition. … Accordingly, it is my view that this offense of 
which the accused was found guilty is as serious as any other rape 
                                                   
 
134 United States v Wiegand 812 F 2d 1239 (9th Cir 1987). Importantly, the court also reasoned that adults can legally 
consent to the ‘diminishment’ of their dignity; but where a child is the target, “the statute will not suffer the insult to the 
human spirit, that the child should be treated as a thing”. Cc R v Hajar 2016 ABCA 222, [2016] 12 WWR 435, finding that 
de facto consent of a child is not a mitigating factor in sentencing for statutory rape, because dignity is violated even in 
cases of ostensible consent. These decisions point to the question of whether dignity can be used to “trump” autonomy, 
which is discussed further below at Part 4B. 
135 R v Barton 2019 SCC 33, 435 DLR (4th) 191. 
136 Leary, supra note 109 (citing lower court). 
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committed anywhere in Canada. The race or cultural background of 
the victim has nothing to do with that.137 
These cases illustrate the “democratization of dignity” that has played out in rape law, 
discussed above at Part 3, whereby over time the “normative other” has come to be 
recognized as also possessing dignity and therefore as equally wronged by rape, regardless 
of externalities. 
The abolition of marital rape immunity is an important example of this extension of 
dignity—specifically, from men to women. In South Africa, the statutory abolition of the 
exemption was described by the Constitutional Court in Masiya v DPP as reflecting a 
changing understanding of rape as a question of women’s dignity, rather than male 
interests, and a rebuke of embedded patriarchal gender norms.138 In the High Court of 
Australia, Justice Brennan has likewise drawn on the dignity of women to argue that Hale’s 
famous proposition of marital rape immunity was wrong in principle.139 Importantly, 
Brennan J also found that the immunity had been fixed at common law by Hale’s statement, 
despite its offensiveness to women’s dignity.140 However, in PGA v R, the High Court held 
that spousal rape was an offence under the common law of Australia at least as early as 
1963, despite the fact that marital rape immunity was treated as a settled common law rule 
at that time.141 As a matter of principle, the PGA decision can be defended as vindicating 
the equal dignity of women; indeed, South Australia argued in PGA that Hale’s proposition 
was offensive to dignity. But the decision also failed to engage with the common law’s role 
in condoning marital rape and women’s sexual subjection for most of the 20th century.142 
This whitewashing of legal history problematically invisibilizes a significant historical 
harm to women’s equal sexual dignity. 
Relating to the extension of dignity protection to all rape victims, a number of 
Canadian judgments emphasized the harm to women’s equal dignity when trial procedures 
embed and reflect rape myths. For example, where previously “unchaste” women were 
seen as inherently unreliable or more likely to have consented to the sexual activity in 
question, now rape shield laws are commonly in place to prohibit such inferences in order 
                                                   
 
137 M (GO), supra note 109. Importantly, this case was handed down in the context of a broader controversy over 
remarks made by another Northwest Territories judge suggesting that rape in the majority-First Nations territory was 
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138 Masiya, supra note 109, [28]. C.c. SW v UK (1996) 21 EHRR 363 [44] (noting that “the abandonment of the 
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to protect the equal dignity of women.143 Likewise, whereas the myth of false rape 
complaints has historically given rise to various corroboration and cautionary 
requirements, the equal dignity of women is arguably recognized and affirmed when such 
requirements are abandoned.144  And in the Ewanchuk decision on implied consent, 
discussed above, L’Heureux-Dubé J wrote separately to centre the case on dignity and 
equality; she criticized the reasoning of the lower courts as based on rape myths that deny 
the equal dignity of women—such as the assumption that “no” sometimes means “yes”, 
“try again” or “persuade me”.145 
 
D. Gendered Dimensions of Dignity 
 
A number of judgments expressly addressed the gendered communal dignity interests 
underpinning rape, by situating individual rape cases in the context of broader societal 
structures and patterns. By acknowledging that rape is disproportionately a crime against 
women and that the threat of rape has functioned to subordinate women in society, courts 
showed an understanding of rape as harming the sexual dignity of womankind:146 
It cannot be forgotten that a sexual assault is very different from other 
assaults. It is true that it, like all the other forms of assault, is an act of 
violence. Yet it is something more than a simple act of violence. 
Sexual assault is in the vast majority of cases gender based. It is an 
assault upon human dignity and constitutes a denial of any concept of 
equality for women.147 
 [F]or far too long rape has been used as a tool to relegate the women 
of this country to second-class citizens, over whom men can exercise 
                                                   
 
143 See Barton, supra note 135, 213 (Abella and Karakatsanis JJ, dissenting in part) (discussing rape myths and the 
“insidious harm” they cause to the “goals of truth and of dignity”, goals which rape shield laws aim to protect) (emphasis 
added). 
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verdict based on uncorroborated evidence, noting in her concurring judgment that the justification for rejection of the 
corroboration requirement is “the need to affirm the principles of equality and human dignity in our criminal law” 
(emphasis added)). Interestingly, in India a “dignity as honour/rape as shameful” argument has been used to argue that 
women do not tend to make false rape accusations and therefore that corroboration is not required as a matter of law: see 
Rafiq, supra note 105; c.c. Gurmit Singh, supra note 111. 
145 Ewanchuk, supra note 124. 
146 Notably, I did not find any instances in the dataset of judges expressly adopting an intersectional communal 
understanding of sexual dignity, such as the group dignity of indigenous women qua indigenous women (see supra at n 84 
and accompanying text). For acknowledgement of the (individual) dignity of an indigenous woman as an indigenous 
woman, see Barton, supra note 135 and accompanying text. A number of Indian cases described rape as a threat to the 
dignity of humankind generally, rather than women specifically: see, e.g., Rafiq 1980 SCC 331 (describing rape as an 
outrage on women’s dignity that ‘puts to shame our ancient cultural heritage and human claims’); Dhana (1994) SC 34 
(rape as ‘an affront to the human dignity of the society’); Shyam Narain (2013) 7 SCC 77 (rape as ‘a crime against [both] 
the holy body of a woman and the soul of the society’) [emphases added]. 
147 Osolin, supra note 1 (Cory J dissenting). 
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their power and control, and in so doing, strip them of their rights to 
equality, human dignity and bodily integrity.148 
The issue of women’s sexual dignity was critical in the South African case of Masiya, a 
constitutional challenge to the exclusion of anal penetration from the common law 
definition of rape. Masiya was convicted of indecent assault for anally penetrating a nine-
year-old girl, resulting in a more lenient sentence than if the charge had been rape. The 
Regional Court held that the definition should be extended to include non-consensual 
sexual penetration of the anus of another person and convicted Masiya of rape. On appeal, 
the majority agreed the definition should be extended to include penetration of a female 
anus, recognizing this as an assault on dignity akin to vaginal rape.149 However, the Court 
declined to extend the definition to cover anal rape of a male. This was primarily because 
it was not raised on the facts. But an additional reason given was that  
… historically, rape has been and continues to be a crime of which 
females are its systemic target. It is … a humiliating, degrading and 
brutal invasion of the dignity and the person of the survivor. It is not 
simply an act of sexual gratification, but … an extreme and flagrant 
form of manifesting male supremacy over females.150 
By using the dignity of women as an argument against extending protection to male 
rape victims, the majority took a “zero-sum” approach151 to individual versus group dignity 
interests, highlighting the communal dimension of dignity at the expense of the individual. 
In his partial dissent, Langa CJ parted ways with the majority on this point: 
Women have always been and remain the primary target of rape. That 
is not a fact that this Court can or should ignore. Nor can we deny that 
male domination of women is an underlying cause of rape. But to my 
mind that does not mean that men must be excluded from the 
definition … To my mind the criminalization of rape is about 
protecting the “dignity, sexual autonomy and privacy” of all people, 
irrespective of their sex or gender.152  
Langa CJ’s approach is pluralistic, embodying a feminist understanding of rape as both a 
harm to individual (including male) dignity and as occurring in a broader context that 
threatens the equal dignity of women. Indeed, Langa CJ expressly situated male-on-male 
rape in this broader context, when he argued that even male rape is gender-based; male 
victims “are dominated in the same manner and for the same reason that women are 
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dominated: because of a need for male gender-supremacy”.153 This pluralistic approach 
allowed for recognition of the gendered, group harm of rape, but without denying the 
dignity interests of male victims, without setting up the rape of a man as less serious than 
the rape of a woman, and without essentializing women as (the only) rape victims. Indeed, 
Langa CJ went on to expressly warn against essentialization, when he cautioned that 
limiting the definition of rape to female victims 
… might well entrench the vulnerable position of women in society 
by perpetuating the stereotype that women are vulnerable, which in 
turn enforces the dangerous cycle of abuse and degradation that has 
historically led to placing women in this intolerable position. The 
unintended effect is to enforce the subordinate social position of 
women which informed the very patriarchy we are committed to 
uproot. The social reality of women cannot be ignored, but we should 
be wary not to worsen it.154 
 
IV. ASSESSING A DIGNITY APPROACH TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
 
Dignity has strong normative pulling power and is a prevalent legal concept across 
subdisciplines, including sexual violence law. Regardless of divergence on its parameters, 
a common baseline allegiance to dignity’s core claims of equal and inherent worth, and 
attendant respect for others, means dignity lends some degree of rhetorical weight to 
judgments about sexual violence. As such, it is unsurprising that, as the case analysis 
illustrates, judges frequently draw on dignity in this context, and this is likely to continue.  
But is dignity necessary here? Is sexual violence a context in which “nothing but dignity 
will do”?155 What are the doctrinal implications of “sexual dignity”, and what are the 
potential drawbacks of a dignity framing of rape? 
 
A. The Expressive Function of Sexual Dignity 
 
Dignity is not the only way to talk about the ethical wrong of rape, just as there is no 
universal experience of the harms of rape. As Cahill has noted, each victim is “an embodied 
and therefore sexed subject”, with different harms accruing to “differently sexed beings”. 
As such, attempts at ethical universalism—identification of the “real” wrong inherent in 
rape—belie the “multiplicity of rape as an embodied experience”.156 Judges are also 
constrained in their ability to explore that multiplicity at length in written judgments. Faced 
with the complexity of sexual assault, judges frequently resort to dignity in their attempts 
to describe and condemn the harms and wrongs of rape.  
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This expressive function is important, because judgments have narrative power for 
victims, offenders and society.157 Judgments use language, including “dignity”, to mediate 
the experience of sexual assault. This can be done in troubling ways, such as by 
reproducing and reifying harmful stereotypes and assumptions, for example that the rape 
victim’s status as a dignity-bearer is indelibly changed or that some women are undignified 
and thus unrapeable. But dignity can equally be used in a way that aligns with and 
empowers a feminist understanding of the multiple harms of sexual violence. Situated in 
feminist theory, sexual dignity is both closely related to and more capacious than honour, 
physical integrity, autonomy, privacy and equality; it follows that rape is about more than 
chastity, physical violence or subjugation alone. This understanding of sexual dignity may 
be particularly appropriate for framing sexual violence in a way that validates the lived 
experiences of rape victims, capacious enough to more fully express and condemn the 
multiplicity of rape’s harms. More than an assault on any one interest, sexual dignity might 
frame rape as an embodied attack on subjectivity itself.158  
Dignity may be a particularly effective concept for highlighting the group interests at 
stake when it comes to sexual violence. This is an important aspect of dignity’s expressive 
power, with potential doctrinal flow-on effects. Feminist theory understands sexual 
violence, both as a societal phenomenon and a legal construct, as not only about individual 
autonomy interests; it also impacts the recognition of the equal dignity of women qua 
women. The case analysis suggests that dignity can reflect and galvanize more expansive 
ways of thinking about consent by focusing on the equal autonomy interests of women. In 
other words, a democratized, egalitarian understanding of “women’s sexual dignity” is 
conducive to the questioning of rape myths and asymmetrical legal standards that do not 
equally protect female subjectivity and freedom to flourish.159 This is seen in cases that 
both affirm the value of autonomy and challenge the embedded patriarchy of rape law’s 
understanding of consent—resistance, “hue and cry”, implied consent, implied marital 
consent, corroboration, admission of a complainant’s sexual history, lesser sentences for 
“lesser victims”—by reference to women’s dignity. On the other hand, the Masiya case 
demonstrates that a group dignity perspective, if applied in a zero-sum way at the expense 
of recognizing individual dignity, can in fact work to undermine the protection of non-
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members (men) from sexual violence and problematically essentialize women as (the only) 
subjects of such harm.  
 
B. Risks of Dignity Discourse 
 
Beyond this expressive function, does a sexual dignity framework have doctrinal 
implications? Importantly, dignity was not relied on in the surveyed caselaw as a way to 
legally distinguish sex from sexual assault. Dignity might be a useful conceptual tool for 
more broadly framing the ethical wrong of non-consensual sex as objectification; it does 
not follow that the legal definition of rape should extend to consensual but purportedly 
objectifying sex—that would be to conflate discrete ethical harms and risk diluting the 
moral authority of rape laws.160 For example, prostitution or sadomasochistic sex might be 
characterized as objectifying, which could be moral/political grounds for imposing 
criminal or civil limitations on those behaviours. But if practised consensually, such sexual 
contact is ethically distinct from non-consensual sexual contact.161 
This points to a broader concern with the concept of sexual dignity, beyond the 
confines of rape law. When sex is non-consensual, we might say that the dignity and 
autonomy interests of the victim coincide—the conduct should be criminalized based on 
the wrong of dignity-denying/autonomy-defying objectification. But unthinking allegiance 
to dignity forged in the context of rape law might have consequences beyond those 
confines, in situations where dignity and autonomy can be viewed as clashing. Specifically, 
an uncritical dignity approach to sexual behaviour generally might lead to a moralistic 
preoccupation with dignity as honour or respect, abstracted from or prior to autonomy, 
resulting in situations where consent to allegedly “undignified” or “dishonourable” 
behaviour is deemed irrelevant or of secondary importance. That is, dignity could be used 
to justify the “trumping” of sexual autonomy, including the choice to debase one’s self, 
with implications for the legal regulation of consensual but non-normative sexual 
behaviour. In other words, when it comes to the regulation of sex generally, the impacts of 
uncritical participation in dignity talk on the normative “other”, and minority sexual rights, 
must be taken seriously.162 
The use of dignity to justify limits on autonomy has been termed “dignitarian”: human 
dignity is read so as to ground obligations—such as the obligation to act honourably—
rather than rights, to the end of protecting humanity’s (noble, honourable, dignified) 
rank.163 A number of scholars have tracked the use of “dignitarian dignity” in constitutional 
law, where it has been used to justify prohibitions on various consensual acts, from dwarf-
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throwing, to peep shows, to prostitution.164 This dignitarian trend relates to an important 
debate in criminal law: whether criminal doctrine should include dignity violations in the 
concept of wrongdoing, even in instances where there is consent to the violation.165 The 
current enquiry does not speak to that debate directly because, as noted above, rape is a 
context in which non-consent is assumed. But the caselaw presented here illustrates that 
judges do descriptively assume dignity; and in some instances, a patriarchal “dignity as 
honour” conception seems to be assumed, which might resonate with and embed a 
dignitarian approach to the regulation of “dishonourable” sexual behaviour generally.  
Returning to rape law specifically, judges clearly sometimes do adopt an uncritical 
understanding of sexual dignity. When dignity is used to equate only to honour, or as 
something impermanent and lost when a person is raped, this may reinforce the shame and 
stigma of rape as “undignified”. It also risks reproducing a normative sexual hierarchy in 
which some victims are cast as less honourable, and some rapes as less serious, than others. 
Again, even within the confines of sexual assault law, uncritical engagement with dignity 
may be harmful for the normative “others”. To return to Moyn’s warning about the 
judicialization of dignity: a robustly theorised approach is needed to ensure that dignity 
does not simply mean whatever a particular judge wants it to mean, which could be as 




Dignity is an appealingly capacious rhetorical device. But that capaciousness comes with 
pitfalls; uncritical dignity talk can be harmful. One way to avoid those pitfalls would be to 
break dignity down into its components, and to talk expressly about particular aspects or 
dimensions of dignity—honour, physical integrity, autonomy, subjectivity, women’s 
equality or some intersection thereof. Such explicit unpacking might allow for more 
meaningful engagement with dignity’s competing conceptions, facilitating convergence 
over time on both “sexual dignity” and sexual violence. However, it remains that a robust, 
multidimensional concept of sexual dignity is potentially a powerful expressive tool when 
it comes to the multiple harms of rape. Further, the caselaw of sexual dignity suggests that 
judges believe sexual dignity to be a useful normative concept and will continue to deploy 
it in decisions on rape. As such, principled and reflective engagement with the assumptions 
and conceptions underpinning sexual dignity is necessary. The case analysis also illustrates 
that in many instances, judges are using dignity in ways that align well with the parameters 
evident in contemporary feminist sexual violence theory.  
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Importantly, these parameters have shifted over time, and sexual dignity will continue 
to be a site of contest. But throughout, a baseline allegiance to the idea of dignity can be 
assumed. Given this allegiance—and I return here to a theme of dignity jurisprudence 
raised in Part 2 above—dignity may create discursive space for contests that over time tend 
to generate consensus.167 This progression is apparent in the history of rape law, framed as 
a process of “democratizing” dignity, with contests and convergence about dignity playing 
out over time. Along the way, marginal cases have become non-marginal, a process that is 
likely to continue. The equal dignity of yesteryear’s “unrapeable” woman has been 
vindicated by recognition of her right to protection from sexual violence. So too an 
expansive dignity framing of sexual violence might continue to facilitate contest and 
eventually convergence, such that today’s marginal cases become non-marginal over 
time—for instance, consensual but coercive sex, or sex in the absence of affirmatively 
communicated consent. That is to say, if robustly and critically theorised, the normative 
power of dignity—a concept which resonates strongly in a 21st century world—might be 
useful for advocating for an expansive, evolving approach to sexual violence. 
Debates about dignity relate to broader questions about the fundamental harms and 
wrongs of rape, and how these should be expressed in criminal law. I do not assert that rape 
is a context in which “nothing but dignity will do”; but given that dignity talk is “being 
done”, we must attempt to do it thoughtfully. It will not do to resort to platitudes when it 
comes to rape. Victims deserve more when we attempt to articulate the multiplicity of 
rape’s harms and wrongs in legal language. Moreover, the concept of sexual dignity that 
emerges in the context of rape might permeate legal, moral and political debates about the 
regulation of non-normative sexual behaviour more broadly. Dignity talk can be powerful 
but should not be engaged in uncritically, or we risk perpetuating patriarchal assumptions 
and “empty-headed moralism” in sexual violence law and beyond. 
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